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Abstract
The degree of competition that a rm faces a¤ects its ability to commit to good
behavior. However, the relationship need not be monotonic since competition a¤ects
the prots when committed to good behavior (such as e¢ cient high quality) and bad
behavior as well as the short-term prots from "cheating". We demonstrate that as
a result competition (using two di¤erent measures of competition which show qualita-
tively similar e¤ects) might have non-monotonic e¤ects on a rms ability to commit.
In particular, a rm might choose to operate in a more competitive environment.
1 Introduction
This note, and the examples below essentially make one simple point that the degree of
competition has ambiguous e¤ects on a rms ability to commit to high quality.
In numerous contexts, such as in professional services industries, it is di¢ cult to write
explicit contracts contingent on outcomes. In such cases implicit contracts and reputational
considerations can play an important role in ensuring e¢ cient actions. There are numerous
exogenous factors which might a¤ect the feasibility of such implicit contracts, or similarly
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of the possibility that a reputational concern can lead to an e¢ cient action.1 Furthermore,
parties may make strategic decisions in order to a¤ect the viability of an implicit contract.2
In this note, we explore the e¤ect of the degree of competition on a rms ability to make a
credible commitment to exert high e¤ort. In particular, we show that changing the degree
of competition that a rm faces has ambiguous and possibly non-monotonic a¤ects on its
ability to make such commitments.
We view these results as contributing to a wider literature that seeks to examine the
extent to which promoting competition increases welfare. As Nickell (1996) states Most
people believe that competition is a good thing.Despite this common wisdom, empirical
and theoretical work has, perhaps surprisingly, been somewhat less sanguine in its assess-
ment.3 Following Hart (1983), a number of papers have focussed primarily on incentives in
a setting where explicit contracts can be written and on e¤ects which are essentially static,
that is e¤ects of competition which are manifest in a single period of production.4 While
some of this literature relies on better signals of managerial e¤ort available through com-
parative performance evaluation in more competitive environments, this a¤ect is absent
from the model presented below, in which at the end of a period there is no uncertainty
about what happened.5 We focus instead on dynamic e¤ects; however, we demonstrate
that competition can have non-monotonic e¤ects on e¤ort.6
A clear and interesting implication of the intuition presented in this note is that there
may be occasions where a rm would be better o¤ in a more competitive environment. By
1 In particular Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) show that as explicit contracting becomes more
e¤ective this can render implicit contracts unfeasible.
2For example, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) show that decisions on the allocation of property
rights can a¤ect relational contracts and in a related idea, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) show that
multi-market contact can make collusion easier to sustain.
3See, in particular, Nickell (1996) and Shmidt (1997).
4An exception is Meyer and Vickers (1997), discussed in Nickell (1996). Here the role that greater
competition plays is to allow for comparative performance evaluation essentially for better information
about the performance of a manager. This can increase reputational incentives but the ratchet e¤ect may
imply that rather incentives are dulled.
5A number of recent papers consider how industry structure a¤ects the returns to skill and implications
for wage inequality (Guadalupe (2003)), contracts (Cuñat and Guadalupe (2003a and b)) and organizational
design (Harstad (2003)). We abstract from such considerations below in considering a model in which rms
are similar.
6Choosing to produce high quality is costly and thus acts as a sort of investment and so our results
showing the ambiguous e¤ects of competition on this kind of investment are related to wide literatures on
the e¤ects of competition on other kinds of investment. In particular, they are related to a large literature
on Schumpeterian innovation and to discussions on the ambiguous e¤ects of market structure on advertising
intensity (see, for example, Sutton (1991), Cabral (2000) and Martin (1993)).
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encouraging a rm to enter the industry or by making its own product more substitutable
with rivalsproducts, a commitment to produce high quality could become credible and
raise prots. 7 ;8
2 Preview of results and central intuitions
In general whether reputational considerations will motivate a rm to perform some costly
action depends on the trade-o¤ between the short-term gain or saving in not performing
the action and the long-term e¤ects of beginning the following period with a relatively
low reputation. Supposing that taking the costly action maintains a high reputation, and
not undertaking it ensures a low reputation (as is typically assumed to be the case in the
literature on relational contracts or equilibria supported by trigger strategies) this trade-o¤
can be summarized by the following inequality which ensures that the rm exerts the costly
action:
short-term cost of action  discounted value of high reputation - discounted value of low
reputation.
One might expect increased competition to reduce prots, both for a high reputation
rm and a low reputation rm. In addition inasmuch as increased competition might lead
to a smaller market share it might also lead to a lower total cost of producing at high
quality the short term cost. Thus the e¤ect of competition on reputational incentives,
as summarized by this inequality above seems ambiguous and will depend on the rate at
which the degree of competition a¤ects these prots and costs.
However, it seems clear that if competition is su¢ ciently severe then the discounted
value of having a high reputation might be driven close to zero, which would make taking
7Such intuition can easily be borne out through specic examples in the model presented below and
such examples are provided in Appendix C.
8Other papers have noted that competition can help a rms ability to commit to behave well, but in
these papers, this is essentially a commitment to behave well in the future. For example, Farrell and Gallini
(1988) and Shepard (1987) highlight that second-sourcing, or encouraging future competition constrains a
monopolists ability to charge a high price or produce at a low observed quality in the future and so might
benet the monopolist in increasing current sales to customers, who must incur product specic set-up
costs. Dudey (1990) and Wernerfelt (1994) argue that rms might locate near each other as a means of
committing to price at a reasonably low level and so encourage customers to pay the search costs required
to visit the rms. In these models, therefore increasing competition increases a rms commitment to
future good behaviour and this has current benets. In the model presented in this note, by contrast, the
commitment problem is with respect to current unobservable behaviour and so whereas in those papers
more competition always helps to overcome the commitment problem, here the e¤ect is non-monotonic.
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the costly action unattractive.9 In this case, a rms temptation to pursue a y-by-night
or hit-and-run strategy whereby the savings from not undertaking the action outweigh the
reputational gains would preclude any expectation that a rm would ever take such action
and any reputational incentives. This intuition, that reputational incentives can only be
maintained if the rm enjoys some premium above costs has been long recognized and has
provoked some discussion on how this observation might be squared with free entry into
markets in essence the resolution was some form of loss-making period of costly signalling
in order to establish the reputation initially and which then leads to a period of maintaining
reputation and enjoying a price premium (see in particular Klein and Le­ er (1981) and
Shapiro (1983)).10
Given this strong intuition that too muchcompetition can damage reputational in-
centives, it is of some interest to determine whether some competition can ever help.
Again, there is strong intuition to suggest that it might; in particular a rm in competition
faces the prospect of a loss in market share as well as a price drop on losing reputation and
so the punishmentfor not exerting e¤ort can be more severe.
Below, we show that both these intuitions have some force in a model where customers
and rms make no quality inferences from a rms quantity decision. In particular, this
implies that overall the degree of competition has ambiguous e¤ects on a rms ability to
commit to high quality.11
3 Model
In order to consider the e¤ect of the degree of competition a rm faces on its ability to
commit to high e¤ort, we introduce a simple model. We suppose that there is only one
9 In addition a low reputation would be driven out of the market and so the value of having a low
reputation would be zero it cannot fall below this value.
10Hörner (2002) considers a model of reputation (that is a model based on beliefs as to the type of a rm)
in which price has a signalling role and so even under perfect competition, a price premium above the cost
of production is maintained, thereby maintaining the incentives to exert e¤ort and maintain reputation. As
discussed at some length below, I suppose that price has no signalling role and so under perfect competition
price would be driven down to marginal cost.
11 In recent and related, independent work, Kranton (2003) argues that competitive e¤ects reduce the
price premium in a model where consumers can use only current price in addition to past quality to make
inferences on the current quality. Thus in Krantons paper, the rst of the two e¤ects highlighted in
the paragraphs above is elaborated, that is the role of competition in preventing an equilibrium where
high quality is maintained. However, the second e¤ect considered here, the potential for some degree of
competition to help in sustaining high quality is precluded by an assumption that a rm that produces
low quality in one period can be held down to zero prots in all future periods. Thus the non-monotonic,
ambiguous, e¤ect of competition on the ability to commit to high quality the focus of this note does not
arise.
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rm in the industry, Firm A, for which there is a commitment problem. In each period
Firm A, chooses whether to produce high quality products at some cost or low quality
costlessly. The rm has a commitment problem inasmuch as prots would be higher if it
could credibly commit to high quality but in each period customers and rival rms, though
they observe the rms quality in previous periods, cannot observe the rms quality in the
current period until after all purchases have been made. It is assumed that there are n
rival rms and that they can only produce high quality.12
In each period, all rms set quantities. Given these quantities and consumersexpec-
tations of quality, prices are determined. The realization of the rms quality in previous
periods informs customersand rivalsexpectations of quality. In particular, we suppose
that if the rm is ever observed producing low quality then it is supposed that the rm
would produce low quality forever thus we restrict attention to trigger strategy equi-
libria. Moreover, quality realizations are commonly and publicly observed at the end of
each period by all customers and all rival rms.
We assume that customersand rivalsexpectations are not a¤ected by any rms choice
of quantity that is an individual rms choice of quantity plays no signalling role. Note, in
particular, that this assumption precludes the possibility that rms collude in this simple
framework.13 This is an important and perhaps controversial assumption. However, it is
certainly plausible to imagine in a richer environment that the current quantity decision of a
rm may be hard for customers to observe or in some sense may be less salient to customers
and, to me at least, the assumption that it does not a¤ect customersexpectations of quality
certainly seems plausible and worth investigating.14 In e¤ect, we restrict attention to a
Markov perfect equilibrium in which the state can take two values corresponding to whether
or not Firm A has ever produced low quality.
We work with a linear demand model with quality indices.15 In this model all consumers
(there are assumed to be a measure 1 of consumers) have the same utility function dened
12We show in Appendix B that relaxing this assumption and instead supposing that all rms make quality
decisions leads to qualitatively similar results.
13Kranton (2003) also considers a similar assumption with respect to rms. However, in that model,
though customers (as here) can use all past realisations of quality to make inferences about current quality,
they can only use the current price. Here in contrast they can use neither current nor past prices to make
inferences about current quality.
14Supposing that customerscompete in bidding for the service that a rm produces would not overcome
this problem, since customers would have to have expectations about the behavior of a rm following each
realized price. This gives innitely many possible continuation games with which one could bootstrap
particular equilibrium behavior.
15See Appendix 2.2 of Sutton (1998) for further details concerning this model.
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over the n+1 goods in the industry (Firm As and those of its n rivals) and of a separated
outside good available at a xed price of unity. The following utility function for a consumer
in period t ensures that the consumers demand schedule for each good takes a relatively
simple linear form:
U =
X
i
(xit   x
2
it
v2it
)  2
X
i
X
k<i
xi
vi
xk
vk
+M , (1)
where xit is the quantity of good i consumed, vit is its quality,  2 [0; 1]measures the degree
of substitutability between di¤erent rmso¤erings andM denotes the consumption of the
outside good which is priced at unity. Writing the consumers income as Y , it follows that
M = Y  P
i
pixi.
In particular, this model implies that the price in period t for rm is product is given
by:
pit = 1  2xit
u2it
  2
uit
X
j 6=i
xjt
ujt
. (2)
Note that the price will depend not on the actual quality of the good and of rival goods,
but rather on their anticipated quality in the period denoted by uit. In particular, all rms
but rm A always produce high quality and so uit = h for all i 6= a and for all t:
Firm A can choose either to produce quality l at a cost 0 or quality h at a cost c per
unit in each period. As discussed below it is socially more e¢ cient and Firm A would prefer
to commit to high quality when h(1  c) > l.16 All rms seek to maximize the discounted
value of prots where the discount factor is given by r.
Below, we discuss the relationship between the possibility that an equilibrium in which
the strategic rm can commit to exert high e¤ort can be sustained and the di¤erent mea-
sures of competition,  and n. First however, it is useful to consider as benchmarks, the
static outcomes when quality is observed before purchase rather than after, as is assumed
through most of the note.
4 Static benchmarks
Before exploring the model discussed above it is useful to calculate per-period prots in
the case where Firm A can commit to high or low quality (or equivalently in the case where
16See the last few paragraphs of Section 4.2 and the Appendix for proof of this claim.
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customers can observe quality before purchase and rivals can observe Firm As quantity
before deciding their own production).
4.1 Firm A produces high quality
Suppose rst that Firm A produces high quality goods, then it produces ah where ah
maximizes its prot, that is:
ah = argmax
x
(1  2x
h2
  2
h
X
j 6=a
xj
h
  c)x: (3)
From the rst order condition, it follows that
ah =
h2
4
(1  c)  
2
X
j 6=i
xj : (4)
Similarly, each of the rival rms i, in equilibrium, chooses x to maximize:
(1  2x
h2
  2
h
X
j 6=i;a
xj
h
  2ah
h2
  c)x (5)
and so
xi =
h2
4
(1  c)  
2
X
j 6=i;a
xj   ah
2
. (6)
By symmetry xj = xh = ah for all j and so
xh = ah =
h2
4
(1  c)  
2
nxh. (7)
Thus
ah =
h2(1  c)
2(2 + n)
. (8)
It follows trivially that the prot in this case is given by :
h =
1
2
h2(1  c)2
(2 + n)2
; (9)
and the price is given by
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ph =
1  c
2 + n
+ c. (10)
Note that the quantity, price and prot vary with respect to the parameters of the
model in an intuitive way. In particular, prots are increasing in h and decreasing in c,
 and n. In particular, competition (as measured either by n the number of rivals in the
industry or  the degree of substitution between the rm and its rivals) decreases both the
price and the quantity and thereby the prots.
4.2 Firm A produces low quality
Suppose that Firm A produces low quality and that the rivals each produce xhl. Then
Firm A will choose to produce al, where al satises
al = argmax
x
(1  2x
l2
  2
l
n
xhl
h
)x, (11)
and so al = l
2
4   l2hnxhl so long as this is positive, otherwise al = 0.
The quantity produced by a rival rm maximizes
(1  2x
h2
  2
h
((n  1)xhl
h
+
al
l
)  c)x. (12)
Taking the rst order condition and assuming symmetry yields
xhl =
h2
2(2 + (n  1))(1  c) 
h
l(2 + (n  1)al (13)
and substituting back into the earlier expression for al yields:
al =
l
2
2l + l(n  1)  h(1  c)n
(2 + n)(2  ) , (14)
so long as
2l + l(n  1)  h(1  c)n > 0: (15)
When Condition (15) fails then xl = l = 0 and note that condition (15) is more likely
to hold the less competitive the environment (the smaller  and n) since h(1   c) > l.
When Condition (15) holds then
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pl =
2l + l(n  1)  hn(1  c)
l(2 + n)(2  ) (16)
and
l =
1
2
(
2l + l(n  1)  hn(1  c)
(2 + n)(2  ) )
2. (17)
Note, in particular, that in this case the prot for the low quality producer (and both
price and quantity) are increasing in l and c and decreasing in h, furthermore it can readily
be veried that they are decreasing in n and in .17
Similarly in the case where condition (15) fails then hl = 12(
2h(1 c) l
(2+n)(2 ))
2 as one might
expect is increasing in h and decreasing in l, c and n but dhld may be either positive or
negative.18 This result is perhaps not surprising it is the e¤ect of business stealing from
a weaker rival which implies that greater substitution between the two might benet the
stronger competitor.
Note that in the case that condition (15) fails h = 12
h2(1 c)2
(2+n)2
> 0 = l.
When condition (15) holds then h > l if and only if
1
2
h2(1  c)2
(2 + n)2
>
1
2
(
2l + l(n  1)  hn(1  c)
(2 + n)(2  ) )
2 (18)
or equivalently
(2 + (n  1))(h(1  c)  l) > 0 (19)
and so in this case h > l if and only if h(1  c)  l > 0.
In either case if h(1 c)  l > 0 then h > l and so as earlier claimed if h(1 c)  l > 0
17For example
dl
d
=  2l + l(n  1)  hn(1  c)
(2 + n)(2  )
4n(h(1  c)  l) + 2n2(h(1  c)  l) + 2nl
(2 + n)2(2  )2
where 2l + l(n  1)  hn(1  c) < 0 and h(1  c) > l so (h(1  c)  l) > 0 and so dl
d
< 0.
18This is also true for xhl = 12h
2h(1 c) l
4+2(n 2) 2(n 1) though phl =
1
h
2h(1 c) l
4+2(n 2) 2(n 1) + c has a di¤erent
comparative static with respect to c.
Note that
dhl
d
= (2h(1  c)  l) l2n+4hn(1 c)(1 ) 4(h(1 c) l)
(2+n)3(2 )3
For example when h(1   c) = 0:9,  = 0:1, n = 1 and l = 0:05 then dhl
d
< 0, but when h(1   c) = 0:9,
 = 0:1, n = 1 and l = 0:1 then dhl
d
> 0 (and in both cases 2l + l(n  1)  h(1  c)n > 0).
9
then if Firm A could credibly commit to high quality production then it would choose to
do so.
5 Commitment
In this section we seek to examine how competition a¤ects the feasibility of an equilibrium
in which Firm A commits to high quality. We restrict attention to a Markov perfect
equilibrium in which the state is a simple indicator of whether or not Firm A has ever
produced low quality and in which quantity has no signalling role. We return to consider
this restriction in the concluding section.
First note that in any subgame in which Firm A had previously produced low quality,
there is no action which would change the state and so the unique equilibrium strategy in
this subgame would be for Firm A to produce low quality in each period and for the static
optimal quantities to be produced.
Suppose that Firm A has not produced a low quality good, if in equilibrium in this
state it produces high quality, then since the quantities chosen by Firm A and its rivals
would not change the state, it is clear that the quantities chosen in each period would be
as in the static case in Section 4.1, where Firm A was committed to high e¤ort. In this
section, essentially we ask whether this is sustainable.19 In order to do so rst consider
the short-term gain from deviating that is of producing low quality when expected to
produce high quality.
The quantity that Firm A produce to maximize prots when producing low quality
when rivals and customers anticipate high quality is ad where ad satises:
ad = argmax
x
(1  2x
h2
  2
h2
nxh)x. (20)
Note that customers expect high quality and as do rival rms so that the price is
(1  2ad
h2
  2
h2
nxh). From the rst order condition and substituting for xh, it can readily be
shown that
xd =
h2
4
2 + cn
2 + n
; (21)
pd =
1
2
2 + cn
2 + n
(22)
19Note that there always exists an equilibrium in which Firm A always produces low quality.
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and prot is given by:
d =
h2
8
(
2 + cn
2 + n
)2. (23)
5.1 Condition to ensure no deviation
It follows that a necessary and su¢ cient condition which ensures that there is a Markov
perfect equilibrium in which rm A produces high quality output is given by:
1
1  rh  d +
r
1  rl (24)
Equivalently
 =
r
1  r (h   l)  (d   h) > 0: (25)
We consider the comparative statics of  with respect to n and , the measures of
competition, examining the cases where l = 0 and l > 0 separately. Note that the
former case is more likely for high values of  (when  > 2lh(1 c)n l(n 1)) and for high
values of n (when n > l 2 (h(1 c) l)). Furthermore as anticipated in the introduction, for
large enough n,
 =
1
1  rh   d =
1
1  r
1
2
h2(1  c)2
(2 + n)2
  h
2
8
(
2 + cn
2 + n
)2
and as n!1, !  h2c28 < 0, that is for large enough n Condition (25) fails.
5.2 Comparative statics with respect to n and 
Case I: Low quality produces nothing after deviation (condition (15) fails)
In this case
= 11 rh   d
= 11 r
1
2
h2(1 c)2
(2+n)2
  h28 (2+cn2+n )2
= h
2(4(1 c)2 (1 r)(2+cn)2)
8(2+n)2(1 r)
(26)
The e¤ect of a change in the degree of substitution between the o¤erings of di¤erent
rms is given by:
11
d
d
=  2nh
2(4(1  c)2   (1  r)(2 + cn)2)
8(2 + n)3(1  r)  
h22cn(2 + cn)
8(2 + n)2
(27)
or, equivalently,
d
d
=  2n  h
22cn(2 + cn)
8(2 + n)2
: (28)
It follows that if  > 0 then dd < 0 but if  < 0 then
d
d may be either positive or
negative.
Similar results obtain for the comparative statics in this case with respect to n.20
Case B: Low quality produces a positive quantity after deviation (condition
(15) holds)
In this case
 =
1
1  rh  
r
1  rl   d, (29)
or equivalently,
 =
h2(4(1  c)2   (1  r)(2 + cn)2)
8(2 + n)2(1  r)  
r
2(1  r)(
2l + l(n  1)  hn(1  c)
(2 + n)(2  ) )
2. (30)
The e¤ect of a change in the degree of substitution between the o¤erings of di¤erent
rms is given by:
d
d =
1
2h
2n2(c r)(1 c)+cn(1 r)(1 c)
(2+n)3(1 r)
+ r(1 r)n
2l+l(n 1) hn(1 c)
(2+n)(2 )
4(h(1 c) l) 2(n 1)l+2nh(1 c)
(2+n)2(2 )2
(31)
The second term is always positive, however since the rst term may be either positive
or negative, the sign of this expression is ambiguous. Similar results apply with respect to
20
d
dn
=  2 h
2
8(2 + n)3(1  r) (4(1  c)
2   (1  r)(2 + cn)2)  h
22c(2 + cn)
8(2 + n)2
or equivalently
d
dn
=  2  h
22c(2 + cn)
8(2 + n)2
and so if  > 0 then d
dn
< 0 but if  < 0 then d
dn
may be either positive or negative.
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Figure 1: Delta against sigma at h=0.81, l=0.63, c=0.1, n=5 and r=0.485
n.21
Thus overall the e¤ect of a change in the degree of competition, measured either by
the number of rival of rms in the industry or as the degree of substitution between the
products of di¤erent of di¤erent rms, has ambiguous e¤ects on , or equivalently on the
possibility that a Markov Perfect equilibrium in which Firm A would produce high quality
can be sustained.
The gures below illustrate that an increase in the degree of competition can have
ambiguous e¤ects, holding all other parameters of the model constant. For example, Figure
1 illustrates that when h = 0:81, l = 0:63, c = 0:1, n = 5 and r = 0:485, then  > 0 holds
at  = 0 but as  increases, it fails, then holds and then fails again.
Figure 2 illustrates that the e¤ect a change in the number of rivals may have an am-
biguous e¤ect on Firm As ability to commit to producing high quality. The gure, which
plots  against log2 n with h = 0:8, l = 0:77, c = 0:02,  = 0:5 and r = 0:51, shows that
21
d
dn
=
1
2
h2
2(c  r)(1  c) + cn(1  r)(1  c)
(2 + n)3 (1  r) +
r
(1  r)
2l + l(n  1)  hn(1  c)
(2 + n)(2  )
2h(1  c)  l
(2 + n)2 (2  )
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Figure 2: Delta against log(n) at h=0.8, l=0.77, c=0.02, sigma=0.5 and r=0.51
 > 0 when n is between 3 and 23, but if there are fewer than 3 or more than 23 rivals
then the condition fails.
Suppose that there is an additional gain to producing high quality (such as pride in
producing high quality or reputational spillovers to other products) then there is an equi-
librium in which Firm A produces high quality so long as  > B. As might be anticipated,
given the results on dd in the case where 2l + l(n   1)   h(1   c)n < 0, this might
lead to even more peculiar relationships between the possibility of maintaining such an
equilibrium and measures of competition. For example Figure 3 illustrates shows that how
the condition  > B varies with  for h = 0:8, l = 0:2, c = 0:3, n = 3, r = 0:405 and
B = 0:01753.
6 Caveats
The model in this note is deliberately made simple to make the point that competition
has ambiguous e¤ects on reputational incentives starkly. However, there are a number of
issues which ought to be considered in rening this intuition in practical application.
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Figure 3: Delta-B against sigma at h=0.8, l=0.2, c=0.3, n=2, r=0.405 and B=0.01753
First, it should be noted that the analysis in this note is partial inasmuch as we take
the market structure as exogenous without addressing sunk costs, barriers to entry or other
reasons why competition might be limited. In addition, in the model presented above we
have focused on a single rms incentives to produce high quality, taking as given that
all other rms in the industry are committed to producing at high quality. We have
argued at some length (and notational complexity) that as the degree of competition in
the industry changes, the prots to holding a high reputation and the prots to holding a
low reputation as well as the cost of maintaining reputation will all change and at di¤erent
rates. Thus, it seems reasonable to suppose that similar e¤ects might apply if all rms had
quality decisions to make in each period, and if the number of rms in the industry was
endogenously determined. We prove the rst of these conjectures below in Appendix B.22
22The argument elaborated in the Appendix B is loosely as follows.
Following Abreu (1988), to consider the viability of an equilibrium in which all rms produce high quality,
one should consider a most severe feasible punishment continuation equilibrium for a rm that deviates.
However, determining which continuation equilibria are feasible is not a trivial exercise (in particular it
may not be feasible that all rival rms produce at high quality after one rm has produced at low quality).
Nevertheless, it can be shown in the static version of the model where all rms are committed either to
low or high quality, that in an industry with n+ 1 rms, prots for a rm committed either to low or high
quality are non-decreasing in the number of rms committed to low quality. It then follows, that Condition
(25) denes a harshest (though possibly not feasible) continuation equilibrium and so can be thought of
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It should further be noted that collusion does not appear in the model and is left
undiscussed. This is perhaps, the most widely discussed topic in formal dynamic models
of industry outcomes with a xed number of rms and so the omission may be a serious
one. In part collusion does not arise in the model as a deliberate modelling choice. Clearly
the degree of competition in an industry a¤ects rms ability to collude; however the
model presented here is intended to be as simple as possible to illustrate a simple point
that competition has ambiguous e¤ects on a rms incentives to maintain reputation with
respect to its customers, which I believe would be robust but perhaps more obscure in a
model that allowed for collusion between rms in the industry.
as a necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium in which all rms produce high quality in a
dynamic version of the model. Since a continuation where all rms produce low quality is always possible,
a su¢ cient condition which ensures the existence of an equilibrium in which all rms produce high quality
is given by:
1
1  r h  d +
r
1  r ll,
where ll = 12
l2
(2+(n 1))2 is the short-term prot that a rm in the industry earns when all the rms
produce low quality and each optimises with respect to the quantity produced.
Examining this condition together with Condition (25) allows us to identify parameters regions in which
an equilibrium in which all rms produce high quality can exist and regions where such an equilibrium cannot
exist (though there are some regions where the existence of such an equilibrium cannot be determined).
Such an analysis is su¢ cent to show that the existence of such an equilibrium is non-monotonic in the
degree of competition. We demonstrate that this is the case for certain parameter values.
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A Proofs of results
In this section, we show that if h(1   c) > l then utilitarian social welfare is higher when
Firm A is committed to high quality production than when it produces low quality.
When Firm A is committed to high quality then recall ah = xh =
h2(1 c)
2(2+n) from Equation
(8), substituting into the utility function (Equation (1)) yields
Uh = (n+1)
h2(1  c)
2(2 + n)
(1  1
h2
h2(1  c)
2(2 + n)
) 2
h2
(n+ 1)n
2
h2(1  c)
2(2 + n)
h2(1  c)
2(2 + n)
+Y (n+1)ph h
2(1  c)
2(2 + n)
.
(32)
Now for Firm A and each of the rival rms
h = (ph   c) h
2(1  c)
2(2 + n)
. (33)
So that welfare when rm A is committed to high quality and there are n rivals is given
by
Wh(n) = (n+1)
h2(1  c)
2(2 + n)
(1  1
h2
h2(1  c)
2(2 + n)
) 2
h2
(n+ 1)n
2
h2(1  c)
2(2 + n)
h2(1  c)
2(2 + n)
+Y (n+1)pc h
2(1  c)
2(2 + n)
,
(34)
or equivalently
Wh(n) =
h2(1  c)2
22(2 + n)2
(n+ 1)(3 + n) + Y . (35)
Now suppose that Firm A cannot commit to high quality but instead produces at low
quality, there are two cases to consider here.
Case 1: Condition (15) fails
In this case Firm A produces nothing and so welfare is given by Wl(n) =Wh(n  1).
Now
d
dn
Wh(n) =
h2(1  c)2
4
2 + n(1  ) + 4(1  )
(2 + n)3
> 0 (36)
and so in particular Wh(n) > Wh(n  1)
and hence in this case Wh(n) > Wl.
Case 2: Condition (15) holds
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Then by Equation (14)
al =
l
2
2l + l(n  1)  h(1  c)n
(2 + n)(2  ) (37)
and by Equation (13)
xhl =
h
2
2h(1  c)  l
(2 + n)(2  ) (38)
Industry prots are given by n(phl   c)xhl + plal and so in this case
Wl(n) = n
h
2
2h(1 c) l
(2+n)(2 )(1  1h2 h2 2h(1 c) l(2+n)(2 ))
 2
h2
(n 1)n
2
h
2
2h(1 c) l
(2+n)(2 )
h
2
2h(1 c) l
(2+n)(2 )   cnh2 2h(1 c) l(2+n)(2 )
+ l2
2l+l(n 1) h(1 c)n
(2+n)(2 ) (1  1l2 l2 2l+l(n 1) h(1 c)n(2+n)(2 ) )
 n2hl h2 2h(1 c) l(2+n)(2 ) l2 2l+l(n 1) h(1 c)n(2+n)(2 ) + Y
(39)
Equivalently
Wl(n) = n
1
4
2h(1 c) l
(2+n)(2 )
6h(1 c)+(2h(1 c) l)(n 1) 3l
(2+n)(2 )
+14
2l+l(n 1) h(1 c)n
(2+n)(2 )
6l+3l(n 1) 22ln+hn(1 c)
(2+n)(2 ) + Y .
(40)
Now consider (Wh  Wl):
Wh  Wl = h
2(1 c)2
22(2+n)2
(n+ 1)(3 + n)  n14 2h(1 c) l(2+n)(2 ) 6h(1 c)+(2h(1 c) l)(n 1) 3l(2+n)(2 )
 14 2l+l(n 1) h(1 c)n(2+n)(2 ) 6l+3l(n 1) 2
2ln+hn(1 c)
(2+n)(2 )
(41)
rearranging terms, it follows that:
(Wh  Wl)4(2 )
2(2+n)2
h(1 c) l =  72ln  12l + 3l2n2   l3n2 + l3n+ 12ln+ 32l + 12l
+ch2n+ 3ch2n2   3hn2c  3h2n2   h2n+ 3hn2   4hn
+4hnc  12h+ 12ch+ 3nh  3nch+ 32h  32ch+ 12h  12ch
(42)
Equivalently
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(Wh  Wl)4(2 )
2(2+n)2
h(1 c) l =  nh(1  c)(4 +  + 3n  2(n+ 1))
+nl(12  7   2(n  1) + 3n) + 3(h(1  c) + l)(4(1  ) + 2)
(43)
Rearranging terms again
(Wh  Wl)4(2 )
2(2+n)2
h(1 c) l = (3n  2n)(2l + (n  1)l   nh(1  c))  (2  )l(3n  2n)
 nh(1  c)(4 +    2) + nl(12  7 + 2) + 3(h(1  c) + l)(4(1  ) + 2)
(44)
Note that (3n 2n) > 0 and by assumption (2l+(n  1)l nh(1  c)) > 0 and so
(Wh  Wl)4(2 )
2(2+n)2
h(1 c) l >  (2  )l(3n  2n)  nh(1  c)(4 +    2)
+nl(12  7 + 2) + 3(h(1  c) + l)(4(1  ) + 2)
. (45)
The right hand side of this inequality it equal to:
(2l+(n 1)l nh(1 c))(4+ 2) 8l+2l+ln(2 )(1 )+2l2+l2(1 )+3(h(1 c)+l)(4(1 )+2)
and since 4 +    2 > 0, this expression is greater than or equal to
 8l + 2l + ln(2  )(1  ) + 2l2 + l2(1  ) + 3(h(1  c) + l)(4(1  ) + 2)
and since n > 1 and we are supposing that since h(1   c) > l, this in turn is greater
than or equal to
 8l+2l+l(2 )(1 )+2l2+l2(1 )+6l(4(1 )+32) = 4l(4 )(1 )+14l2 > 0
and thus in this case too when h(1  c) > l > 0, then Wh > Wl.
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B All rms make quality decisions
In this section, we modify the model in the main body of the text by assuming that all
n+1 rms in the industry are symmetric and must make a decision in each period whether
to produce high or low quality (that is the n rivals of Firm A are no longer committed to
high quality exogenously). The question we address below is whether an equilibrium exists
in which all rms in the industry can credibly commit to high quality production.
B.1 Static benchmark: m rms low, n+ 1 m high
First consider the static benchmark in which product quality is anticipated and can be
observed prior to purchase and where of the n + 1 rms in the industry, m produce low
quality and the rest produce high quality.
Suppose that in equilibrium each low quality producers output is xlm and each high
quality producers output is xhm.
Then for a low quality producer, the xlm is determined by choosing x to maximize:
(1  2x
l2
  2
hl
(n+ 1 m)xhm   2
l2
(m  1)xlm)x
Similarly for a high quality producer, the problem is to choose x to maximize
(1  2x
h2
  2
h2
(n m)xhm   2
hl
mxlm   c)x
So the rst order conditions yield:
xhm =
h2(1  c)
2(2 + (n m))  
mh
l(2 + (n m))xlm (46)
and
1  4xlm
l2
  2
hl
(n m+ 1)xhm   2
l2
(m  1)xlm = 0
so long as xlm > 0.
In this latter case
xlm =
l
2
l(2 + (n m))  h(1  c)(n+ 1 m)
4 + 2(n  1)  2n (47)
Thus if 2l+ l(n m)  h(1  c)(n+ 1 m) > 0 (a condition which is more likely to
hold the larger is m)
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then
xlm =
l
2
l(2 + (n m  1))  h(1  c)(n m)
4 + 2(n  2)  2(n  1) (48)
and
xhm =
h
2
2h(1  c) + h(m  1)(1  c)  lm
(2 + (n+ 1)  ) (2  ) . (49)
Then
lm =
1
2
(
2l + l(n m)  h(1  c)(n+ 1 m)
4 + 2(n  1)  2n )
2 (50)
which is increasing in m and
hm =
1
2
(2h(1  c) + h(m  1)(1  c)  lm)2
(2 + (n+ 1)  )2 (2  )2 (51)
which is increasing in m.
Otherwise, that is if l(2 + (n m))  h(1  c)(n+ 1 m) < 0,
then lm = 0 and
hm =
1
2
h2(1  c)2
(2 + (n m))2 (52)
which is increasing in m.
Note in particular that consideration of these two cases implies that lm is increasing
in m.23
B.2 Necessary and su¢ cient conditions
That lm is increasing inm suggests that for a rm producing low quality and anticipated to
produce low quality the lowest prots are earned when all other rms produce high quality
and so a most severe punishment for defection from a situation when all are producing high
23 In addition and as one might anticipate hm is also increasing in m.
hm is increasing in the region l(2 + (n m))  h(1  c)(n+1 m) > 0 and in the region l(2 + (n 
m))  h(1  c)(n+ 1 m) > 0.
At l(2 + (n m))  h(1  c)(n+ 1 m) = 0 then l = h(1 c)(n+1 m)
2+(n m) and
1
2
(2h(1 c)+h(m 1)(1 c) lm)2
(2+(n+1) )2(2 )2 =
1
2
h2(1 c)2
(2+(n m))2
so hm is continuous throughout and so in particular the two regions connect and so hm is increasing
in m.
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quality is that following a defection, all the rivals continue producing high quality. Thus
a necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium in which all rms in the industry
produce high quality is (25).
However such a continuation may not be feasible, that is it may not be the case that
a continuation in which one rm produces low quality and all others produce high can be
sustained as an equilibrium. One continuation equilibrium that can always be sustained
is that all rms produce low quality for ever. Specically, we suppose that following a
deviation by a rm, in the future all rms produce low quality outputs it is clear that
the most severe punishment that can be sustained in equilibrium is at least as severe as
this one. Using the earlier static results it follows that a su¢ cient condition which ensures
that there is an equilibrium in which all rms produce high quality output is given by, it
follows that a su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium in which all rms produce high quality
is given by:
1
1  rh  d +
r
1  rll, (53)
where ll = 12
l2
(2+n)2
is the short-term prot that a rm in the industry earns when all
the rms produce low quality and each optimizes with respect to the quantity produced.
Let
suff =
1
1  rh   d  
r
1  rll: (54)
We proceed by considering the comparative statics of suff with respect to n and
 the measures of competition.
suff =
1
1  r
1
2
h2(1  c)2
(2 + n)2
  h
2
8
(
2 + cn
2 + n
)2   r
1  r
1
2
l2
(2 + n)2
: (55)
Equivalently
suff =
4h2(1  c)2   (1  r)h2(2 + cn)2   4rl2
8(1  r)(2 + n)2 : (56)
The rst derivative with respect to n is given by:
dsuff
dn =  (1 r)h
22(2+cn)c
8(1 r)2+n)2   2 4h
2(1 c)2 (1 r)h2(2+cn)2 4rl2
8(1 r)(2+n)3
=   (1 r)h22(2+cn)c
8(1 r)2+n)2   2suff
, (57)
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or equivalently
dsuff
dn
=  (1  r)h
22(2 + cn)c
8(1  r)2 + n)2   2suff : (58)
Note in particular that if suff > 0 then
dsuff
dn < 0 but otherwise it is not clear how
to sign this.
The rst derivative with respect to  is:
dsuff
d
=  (1  r)h
22(2 + cn)cn
8(1  r)(2 + n)2   2n
4h2(1  c)2   (1  r)h2(2 + cn)2   4rl2
8(1  r)(2 + n)3 (59)
or equivalently
dsuff
d
=  (1  r)h
22(2 + cn)cn
8(1  r)(2 + n)2   2nsuff : (60)
Again if suff > 0 then
dsuff
dn < 0 but otherwise the sign of
dsuff
d is ambiguous.
Thus increased competition either through an increase in n or an increase in  cannot
make it more likely that suff > 0; however, if there is an additional benet to non-
deviation then the necessary condition suff +B > 0 may have an ambiguous relationship
with n and .
B.3 Existence of an equilibrium
When the su¢ cient condition holds, then an equilibrium in which all rms produce high
quality can be sustained, however when it fails then the possibility that such an equilibrium
can be sustained cannot be ruled out. However, existence of such an equilibrium can
be ruled out when the necessity condition fails. Thus by examining the two conditions
simultaneously, it is possible to show that the existence of such an equilibrium is not
monotonic in the measures of the degree of competition in the industry. Specically such
an equilibrium exists when suff + B > 0 but does not exist when  + B < 0; in the
intermediate case (that is when suff < 0 and  > 0) the conditions are insu¢ cient to
prove the existence or non-existence of such an equilibrium).24
In the light of earlier results and examples, it is perhaps unsurprising that the e¤ect of
an increase in the level of competition (either as an increase in  or in n) has an ambiguous
24 It is trivial to show that  > suff and indeed is a corollary of the result that lm is increasing in m.
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Figure 4: Necessity and su¢ ciency conditions against sigma at h=0.8, l=0.2, c=0.39, n=8,
r=0.6 and B=0.02
e¤ect on the possibility that an equilibrium in which all rms can credibly commit to
produce high quality outputs. This is demonstrated by the Figures 4 and 5. In both these
gures an equilibrium in which all the rms in the industry can credibly commit to high
quality exists in the regions A and E but not in the region C.25
C Examples where a rm would prefer more competition
For the case of increasing prots through changing , it would be hard to interpret such
a change when n > 1 (it is not obvious how could an individual rm a¤ect the degree of
substitution between two other rms. In the case n = 1 where changing the degree of sub-
stitution between its own and its rivals products is a more plausible modelling assumption,
it is easy to construct examples in which Firm A could benet from a higher . This is
the case for example at h = 0:3, l = 0:18, c = 0:1, and  around 0:54.
Encouraging another rm into the industry may be a plausible modelling assumption
(for example in consulting this may be a choice to allow or encourage some partners to spin
25 In these gures the line necessary condition represents  + B and the line su¢ cient condition
suff +B.
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Figure 5: Necessity and su¢ ciency conditions against n at h=0.9, l=0.2, c=0.3, sigma=0.1,
r=0.5 and B=0.017
o¤ or in general it may involve licensing or otherwise di¤using specialist knowledge). If
this is possible, again a rm may benet from doing so. For example, at h = 0:8, l = 0:71,
c = 0:05,  = 0:6, Firm A can commit to high quality and earn higher per-period prots
when n = 4 than when n = 3 and it can make no such commitment.
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